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ABSTRACT 
 
ANA-MARIA MANUELA MOT: Kazakhstan and the 2010 Chairmanship of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe - Progress Toward Democracy? 
(Under the direction of Dr. Graeme Robertson) 
 
 
 
The association of Kazakhstan to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), a regional organization with a strong human rights component, could not 
induce the oil-rich Central Asian country, long since criticized for its poor human rights 
record, to change its behavior toward sustainable democratic progress. For Kazakhstan, the 
2010 chairmanship of the OSCE represented a missed opportunity to fulfill its pledges to 
develop civil and political rights aimed at bringing democratic changes. There are two main 
reasons for this failure: on the one hand, the lack of institutional capacity of the OSCE in 
providing an incentive and punishment mechanism to enforce the participating states to fulfill 
their commitments and on the other hand a combination of external factors and internal 
conditions in Kazakhstan that prevent democratic development. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On December 1 and 2,
 
2010 the Kazakh capital held one of the most significant 
events in the history of the country‟s foreign policy, namely the Vienna-based Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit. Heads of states and governments, 
deputy prime-ministers and ministers from the fifty-six OSCE participating states gathered in 
Astana for the organization‟s first summit in eleven years since the last one held in Istanbul. 
The event boosted a major public relations success for Kazakhstan and for its long time 
leader Nursultan Nazarbayev, by setting a precedent: the first former Soviet republic, the first 
predominantly Muslim nation, and the first Central Asian country to hold the annually 
rotating chairmanship of one of the most prestigious regional organizations. It was a big 
party that had everything: glamorous settings, statesmen‟s arrivals on the red carpet, dramatic 
handshakes in front of TV cameras, big smiles, and group pictures. It was a show worth 
millions of dollars aimed to prove that the oil-rich Central Asian country is a world class 
power and capable of managing international responsibilities. What did Kazakhstan gain out 
from it? In terms of public relations, the chairmanship definitely was a success for both the 
country and Nazarbayev. In terms of changes at the level of Kazakh society and expectations 
for furthering democracy the outcome was disappointing.  
In this paper, I argue that the country‟s association with the OSCE and hosting the 
2010 chairmanship of the organization did not help Kazakhstan bring about substantive 
domestic changes or improve its poor human rights records. The association with the OSCE, 
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which today is better known as a human rights watchdog rather than a regional security 
organization could not induce Kazakhstan to change its behavior toward democratic progress 
and try to come closer to international human rights standards. In this way the theory of 
socialization according to which the affiliation with an organization and the constant 
interaction between the members states (in this case participating states), failed in the case of 
Kazakhstan and OSCE. There are two main reasons for this failure. On the one hand, there is 
the weakness of the OSCE in providing an incentive and punishment mechanism to enforce 
upon participating states to fulfill their commitments and, on the other hand, there is lack of 
interest of the Kazakh leadership combined with lack of capacity in Kazakh society to further 
democratic progress.   
An efficient platform for the East -West dialogue during the détente period of the 
Cold War, the OSCE worked actively in Central and Eastern Europe with notable 
achievements in the political and security dimension during the 1980s and 1990s. The OSCE 
still remains a promoter of democracy in the twenty-first century as a regional forum for 
political dialogue, negotiations and partnerships. However, due to its lack of capacity to 
enforce a “carrot and stick” mechanism the organization is powerless against those who fail 
to comply with the OSCE‟s standards. The “name and shame” method or by publicly 
criticizing the participating states who fail to satisfy the principles of the organization is 
apparently what the OSCE can do. Neither the expected socialization, between the Kazakh 
diplomats and their counterparts from the OSCE participating states seemed to have 
meaningful impact. 
 On the other hand, the other reason for the failure is related to the inability of 
Kazakhstan to further any significant democratic development. The Kazakh leadership 
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displays strong authoritarian feature as the power has been held in Nazarbayev‟s hands for 
over two decades. Therefore, Kazakhstan is not a model democracy and many reports 
prepared by Freedom House and Human Rights Watch criticize the country for human rights 
violation, especially with regard to freedom of media, freedom of religion, and limited 
political participation. This does not seem to bother the Kazakh leadership too much. The 
country‟s excellent geostrategic position between Russia and China and its highly developed 
economy based on oil and gas extractive industry makes it attractive to both Western and 
Eastern partners. Nazarbayev, who was the last former Secretary-General of the Communist 
Party in Kazakhstan and the only president elected since the 1991 country‟s independence, 
plays the resources and geostrategic cards accordingly. That is perhaps why Kazakhstan did 
not have an incentive to keep the promises made at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Madrid 
in 2007 when the then Kazakh Foreign Minister, Marat Tazhin, pledged that his country 
would advance democratic reforms with regard to media, electoral process, and political 
participation aimed to address the human rights question in the Central Asian nation. 
  Kazakhstan was selected Chairman of the OSCE neither for its merits, nor for 
commitment to bring about reforms, but rather as part of a broad attempt to appease the 
tensions existing between the West and East bloc within the organization. The Eastern group, 
led by Russia, complained for several years that the OSCE had focused on human rights 
violations east of Vienna and was less oriented on economic and security issues. In this 
context, the choice of Kazakhstan seemed to satisfy Russia‟s demands which over the past 
years has threatened to hold on to the OSCE‟s budget, and on the other hand, to appease the 
East-West division. 
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To start, this paper assesses the human rights situation in Kazakhstan, before and after the 
Madrid commitments of 2007, by using reports from human rights organizations. Then, it 
will look into the international socialization theory and the role of international organizations 
in promoting democracy in transitioning societies. Then, it will discuss the weaknesses of the 
OSCE, emphasizing on its lack of reward and punishment mechanism and the issues posed 
by the consensus-based decision, and try to explain why, in comparison to other European 
organizations, it does not seem to be successful in effectively promoting democratic changes. 
The next section will discuss Kazakhstan‟s internal political context to better understand why 
it did not provide incentives to further democratic development. The paper will also touch 
upon briefly the background behind choosing Kazakhstan as the 2010 chair of the OSCE. In 
conclusion, I will highlight that, despite Kazakhstan‟s missed opportunity to bring about 
changes and the OSCE‟s inefficiency in offering incentive to the OSCE participating states to 
take serious steps toward democracy, the Central Asian nation will not suffer sanctions and 
will not be isolated in the international arena. On the contrary, as one Washington D.C.-based 
expert put it, Kazakhstan paved the way to further exhibit its international experience and 
consolidate its position as a wealthy regional player which the international community 
should take into consideration when dealing with the region. 
   
 
  
 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE AND AFTER MADRID 
 
1.  Introduction 
This section presents the human rights situation in Kazakhstan, before and after the 
commitments made by the Kazakh Foreign Minister at the 2007 OSCE Ministerial Council in 
Madrid, when the country was selected to chair the organization in 2010. The assessment 
analyses three main areas in which Kazakhstan promised to deliver reforms, namely electoral 
process, political participation, and media, by looking into several reports and evaluations 
prepared by human rights and media organizations.  Overall, the changes did not allow for 
meaningful steps to improve the political and civil rights and human rights record did not 
improve. 
Kazakhstan has been constantly criticized for its lack of fairness in the electoral 
process and observers have reported that elections have been far from free. After a period of 
political violence in the mid-2000s and killing of couple of opposition leaders,  Zamanbek 
Nurkadilov of For a Fair Kazakhstan
 
 group and Altynbek Sarsenbayev of Nagyz Ak Zhol,  
the 2007 elections created a single party legislature with Members of Parliament from the 
presidential ruling party
1
. The opposition has no representatives in the Parliament. Although 
the amendments open the way to a multiparty system in the legislative branch starting next
                                                          
1
  Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009, Kazakhstan, at 
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session7/KZ/FH_UPR_KAZ_S07_2010_FreedomHouse_Anne
x1.pdf (accessed March 6, 2011) 
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elections observers fear that this would rather create an illusory parliamentary pluralism by 
helping pro-government or authorized opposition groups to enter Parliament. 
 Political life is almost under complete control of president Nazarbayev and his Nur-
Otan presidential party. Opposition parties face constant constraints and oppression form of 
arbitrary arrests or persecution. The amendments on the law of political parties did not 
produce significant developments. The registration process remained harsh and the 
legislation included excessive provisions, such as prohibiting parties based on ethnicity or 
religion, requiring personal information on the members, or limitations for those who seek 
public office.  
There has not been much improvement with regard to freedom of the media either. 
Observers say that media in Kazakhstan is not free. Despite some positive changes regarding 
journalists‟ rights and media self-regulation, authorities continue to oppress and boycott 
independent and opposition media outlets and journalists. The current situation does not give 
future hopes: the Internet is restricted, government blocks opposition websites, media outlets 
are shut down, libel is still criminal offense, and journalists are harassed, intimidated and 
sometimes even imprisoned. 
 
1. Madrid Commitments 
 During the OSCE Ministerial Council summit in Madrid in November 2007 when 
Kazakhstan was selected to chair the organization in 2010, the Kazakh Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Marat Tazhin, delivered a speech in which he laid down the plans for the country‟s 
further democratic progress. He promised that Kazakhstan would take the necessary steps to 
undergo significant political reforms in the field of media, increase the political participation, 
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and electoral process, aimed at advancing democratic reforms to address the political and 
civil rights. The promises known as ”Madrid  Commitments” were transposed into a package 
of amendments called “Kazakhstan‟s 2009-2012 National Human Rights Action Plan” which 
was finalized in October 2008 and signed by Nazarbayev in early 2009. The plan represented 
the new legislation on media, elections, and political parties aimed at fulfilling the “Madrid 
Commitments” and the amendments incorporated many of the recommendations made by 
NGOs, media advocacy groups, Kazakh human rights defenders, Freedom House, and the 
OSCE
2
.   
 
2. Elections 
According to Kazakh authorities, the new amendments on the election law were to 
open the way for a multiparty system in Parliament starting next elections.
3
 In the case that 
there is only one political party that passes the seven percent threshold to access to the 
Parliament, the next vote-getter gainer, regardless of the percentage of votes received, will be 
also granted seats in the legislative branch. The deadline for party registration was extended 
from two to four months, after holding the founding convention. According to the changes 
media must equally cover candidates and parties both from ruling and opposition parties, 
while foreign observers will not need any more any pre-requisite experience in monitoring 
elections.  
                                                          
2
 Embassy of Kazakhstan in the US, News bulletin, June 1, 2010, at 
http://www.kazakhembus.com/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,print,0&cntnt01articleid=363&cntnt01showtemp
late=false&cntnt01returnid=211. Next parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan are scheduled in 2011. 
 
3
 Ibid. 2 (Embassy of Kazakhstan‟s document) 
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 For years, human rights organizations argued that Kazakhstan was anything but an 
electoral democracy, since fairness of electoral process had been a serious issue.
4
 According 
to Freedom House, all parliamentary and municipal elections since 1999 onwards saw 
electoral fraud and failed to match the criteria for fair and free elections.
5
  Members of the 
opposition protested, inefficiently, against the election results, while the government ignored 
the OSCE findings that most of the time elections faulted “elements of the new legal 
framework”.  
  The years 2005-2006 were characterized by political violence. The suspicious 
suicide of Zamanbek Nurkadilov, a member of the leading opposition group For a Fair 
Kazakhstan
 6
, and the killing of Altynbek Sarsenbayev, co-chairman of opposition group 
Nagyz Ak Zhol (True Bright Path)
7
, “highlighted the country‟s disturbing tendency toward 
political violence”.8 Constitutional amendments passed in May 2007 removed term limits for 
Nazarbayev, opening the way for lifetime presidency, and replaced the single mandate voting 
with the proportional representation system based on party list. The 2007 elections 
consolidated the president‟s power, when Nazarbayev eliminated “the last vestiges of 
                                                          
4
 Bhavna Dave, Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2010, at http://www.freedomhouse.eu/images/Reports/NIT-
2010-Kazakhstan-final-final.pdf  
 
5
 Freedom House, Kazakhstan „s OSCE commitments on democracy and rule of law in light of upcoming 
Kazakhstan OSCE  chairmanship, September 2008 
 
6
Nurkadilov was former mayor of Almaty and former minister of Emergency Situations in the government of 
President Nazarbayev. In 2004 he become criticizing Nazarbayev and threatened to speak publicly about high- 
level corruption. On November 14, 2005 he has been found shot death, with two bullets in his chest and one in 
his head. Andrew E. Kramer, “Kazakh opposition member slain”, The New York Times, November 14, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/14/world/asia/14iht-stan.html (accessed March 29, 2011) 
 
7
 Sarsenbayev was former Information Minister and Kazakhstan‟s Ambassador to Russia. He was found shot 
dead in his car on February 13, 2006. “Suspicions raised over Kazakh deaths”, BBC News, February 14, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4712674.stm (accessed March 29, 2011). 
 
8
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2007, Kazakhstan,  at  
http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7204 (accessed  March 5, 2011) 
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parliamentary independence and humbled potential rivals in his own family.”9 August 
parliamentary elections held under this new rule produced a single-party legislature with only 
deputies from the ruling presidential Nur Otan party, since no opposition party passed the 
seven percent threshold to get into the Parliament. One US State Department report notes that 
all 400 court cases filed by the opposition for alleging violations of law were dismissed or 
denied. 
 A year after the Kazakh Foreign Minister presented the “Madrid Commitments” 
observers noted that “the government failed to implement democratic reforms in 2008”10 
despite pledges. Freedom House and the OSCE sharply criticized the legislation on the 
electoral process and noted that recommendations provided for their improvements have 
almost entirely been disregarded. The elections to the Assembly of Peoples (the upper house 
of the Parliament) produced a legislature “devoid of opposition representation”.11 The 
elections for the upper parliamentary house took place without opposition candidates, a 
factor that further limited the opposition‟s activity. 12  
The law continued to allow the appointment of nine individuals from the Assembly of 
People to the Majilis (the lower house of the Parliament), which, according to Freedom 
House, “contradicts the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension of 
                                                          
9
 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2008, Kazakhstan, at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?year=2008&country=7421&pf 
(accessed March 5, 2011) 
 
10
 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009, Kazakhstan, at 
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session7/KZ/FH_UPR_KAZ_S07_2010_FreedomHouse_Anne
x1.pdf (accessed March 6, 2011) 
 
11
 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2010, Kazakhstan, at 
http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010&country=7850 (accessed March 6, 2011) 
 
12
 US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009 Country reports on human 
rights and practices, 2009 Human Rights Report: Kazakhstan,  March 11, 2010, at  
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136088.htm (accessed February 15, 2011) 
 
10 
 
the CSCE
13
, under which all the seats in at least in one house of the national parliament have 
to be freely disputed by candidates during a general election”.14  The legislation continues to 
restrict the rights to be elected by prohibiting individual with prior criminal record to run for 
office. The amendments under which the next party receiving the largest number of votes 
would be granted seats in the legislative branch even if only one party passes the seven 
percent threshold is believed to pave “the way for another pro-government or an authorized 
opposition party to enter Parliament and create the illusion of a multiparty system”.15 
However, the changes to the electoral system have not yet been tested since no parliamentary 
elections have taken place under the new legislation. The next legislative elections are 
scheduled for 2012, and it looks like the authorities changed their attitude vis-à-vis the OSCE 
election monitors. After denying elections monitors full access to observe the electoral 
process in the past, this time “Kazakhstan invited OSCE experts to monitor the 2012 
elections”.16 
 
3. Political Parties 
 Astana took steps toward election legislation reform aimed at political parties to 
liberalize the registration of political parties and increasing their role in the political process. 
                                                          
13
 Before mid 1990s OSCE operated like a series of conferences and meetings held in different locations in 
Europe under the name of Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During the 1994 
summit in Budapest CSCE begun its institutional transformation process and became an organization under the 
name of OSCE. 
 
14
 Bhavna Dave, Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2010, at 
http://www.freedomhouse.eu/images/Reports/NIT-2010-Kazakhstan-final-final.pdf  (accessed March 6, 2011) 
 
15
  Ibid. 14  (Nations in Transit 2010) 
 
16
  Discussion with Douglas Davidson on February 9, 2011 in Washington, D.C. Mr. Davidson is former Deputy 
US Representative to the OSCE in Vienna (2201-2004) and former head of OSCE mission in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (2004-2008). Mr. Davidson is currently Special Envoy for Holocaust issues. 
 
11 
 
The amendments have reduced the requirements for registering a political party.
17
 The 
number of members necessary for registration in each oblast or region dropped from over 
1,000 to 600 and the nationwide number from 50,000 to 40,000. The deadline for registration 
after the constituent conference has been extended.  According to the document, the new 
changes open “the avenue for the state to fund and financially support activity of political 
parties”.18  
 Despite these changes, the situation has had little noticeable improvements. 
Registration requirements of political parties remained harsh and observers believe that 
changes were minimal and did not produce significant positive developments. There are still 
some excessive legal provisions that have not eased the registration process. The new 
provisions requires collection of personal information about the members (such as date and 
place of birth, address, and place of employment), an aspect which discourages many citizens 
from joining political organizations. The legislation still prohibits parties based on “ethnic 
origin, religion, or gender”19 and only ten parties have been registered so far. There are 
several limitations, such as the right to seek public office in the form of a ten-year residency 
and party membership requirements, and a provision allowing the Assembly of People to 
choose nine of the 107 members of the Mazhilis
20
 (the lower house of the legislative branch). 
                                                          
17
 Embassy of Kazakhstan in the US, News bulletin, June 1, 2010, at 
http://www.kazakhembus.com/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,print,0&cntnt01articleid=363&cntnt01showtemp
late=false&cntnt01returnid=211 (accessed March 6, 2011) 
 
18
 Embassy of Kazakhstan in the US, News bulletin, June 1, 2010, at 
http://www.kazakhembus.com/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,print,0&cntnt01articleid=363&cntnt01showtemp
late=false&cntnt01returnid=211 (accessed March 6, 2011) 
 
19
 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2010, Kazakhstan, at 
http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010&country=7850 (accessed March 6, 2011) 
 
20
 US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009 Country reports on human 
rights and practices, 2009 Human Rights Report: Kazakhstan,  March 11, 2010,  at  
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136088.htm (accessed February 15, 2011) 
12 
 
 Freedom House holds Nazarbayev and his presidential party responsible for 
maintaining almost complete control over the politics in 2009, using “long standing 
authoritarian practices”, such as arbitrary arrests, restrictive new laws, or politically 
motivated persecutions
21
. Perhaps the most prominent case of political imprisonment is of 
well-known human rights defender and director of Kazakhstan‟s International Bureau for 
Human Rights and Rule of Law, Yevgeniy Zhovtis. In October 2009 the court upheld a four-
year sentence of Zhovtis on charges of vehicular manslaughter, after a trial that was fraught 
with procedural violations. According to the US State Department 2009 Human Rights
 
 
Report observers criticized the trial for procedural violations and alleged that the sentence 
imposed on him was politically motivated and his imprisonment amounted to political 
persecution to silence to government's most vocal critic in advance of the country's 
chairmanship of the OSCE.
22
  
 
4. Media 
One of the most oppressive sectors remaining in Kazakhstan is the media, where the 
amendments have not had a significant positive effect on the freedom of expression. There 
have been some positive changes undertaken by the government, such as the broadening of 
journalists‟ rights and ensuring self-regulation of the media.23 Also, the number of cases 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
21
 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2010, Kazakhstan, at 
http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010&country=7850 (accessed March 6, 2011) 
 
22
 US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009 Country reports on human 
rights and practices, 2009 Human Rights Report: Kazakhstan,  March 11, 2010,  at  
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136088.htm (accessed February 15, 2011) 
 
23
 Embassy of Kazakhstan in the US, News bulletin, June 1, 2010, at 
http://www.kazakhembus.com/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,print,0&cntnt01articleid=363&cntnt01showtemp
late=false&cntnt01returnid=211 
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leading to re-registration of print media and information agencies was reduced and 
registration for broadcasting media, including websites, was abolished (although not for other 
media outlets)
24
. Journalists no longer need to obtain consent for using electronic equipment 
during interviews and confiscation of newspaper editions was recognized as an alternative to 
administrative sanctions. The amendments also allow the media to make appeal in the court 
in case of denials of governmental information.
25
 
 The government control through loyalists of broadcast media stations, threats and 
harassment against journalists who criticized the president and the government, and the 
existence of criminal charges for libel created “an environment of anxiety in which 
journalists are faced with the constant threat of lawsuits and, not infrequently, direct threats 
to their person”26. Journalists have been fined, asked to pay substantial amount of money to 
the officials whom they allegedly offended, while media outlets were closed and their bank 
accounts frozen. Just a year before Kazakhstan pledged in Madrid to increase the freedom of 
media the government tightened its control on the media. Because media outlets were subject 
to new regulatory and registration requirements, most media outlets became controlled “or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
  
24 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Kazakhstan: Seven months before the OSCE Chairmanship,  May 19, 
2009,  at http://www.hrw.org/node/83329 (accessed March 7, 2011) 
 
25
 Embassy of Kazakhstan in the US, News bulletin, June 1, 2010, at 
http://www.kazakhembus.com/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,print,0&cntnt01articleid=363&cntnt01showtemp
late=false&cntnt01returnid=211 
  
26
 Human Rights Watch, Kazakhstan: improve human rights record. Changes needed for upcoming OSCE 
leadership role, May 19, 2009, at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/05/19/kazakhstan-improve-human-rights-
record (accessed march 7, 2011) 
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otherwise influenced by members of the president‟s family or other powerful interest 
groups.”27 
Starting in 2000, Freedom House has categorized Kazakhstan as “not free”28 and 
ranked former Soviet republic among the most undemocratic countries in the world.
29
 In 
2010, Freedom House gave Kazakhstan extremely low scores, between 5.75 and 6.75 (the 
highest level of democratic progress is 1 and 7 is the lowest) to all the areas that were 
evaluated.
30
  In the year of the Kazakhstan‟s OSCE chairmanship, the Central Asian country 
performed even worse than the previous year with the overall democracy score worsening 
from 6.32 to 6.43. The media score also declined to 6.75, being comparable to the 
neighboring countries.  In 2010 Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan scored 7
31
 
32
, while 
Kyrgyzstan 6.50
33
 and Russia 6.25
34
. The same negative trend has been observed by other 
media watchdogs.  In 2006 the Reporters without Borders Press Freedom Index ranked 
                                                          
27
  Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009, Kazakhstan, at 
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session7/KZ/FH_UPR_KAZ_S07_2010_FreedomHouse_Anne
x1.pdf (March 6, 2011) 
 
28
  Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2005, Kazakhstan, at 
http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2005&country=6764 (accessed March 6, 2011) 
 
29
 Bhavna Dave, Nations in Transit 2010, Kazakhstan, Freedom House, at 
http://www.freedomhouse.eu/images/Reports/NIT-2010-Kazakhstan-final-final.pdf  (accessed March 6, 2011) 
 
30
 The areas are: electoral process, civil society, independent media, national democratic governance, judicial 
framework and independence, local democratic government, judicial framework and independence, and 
corruption. 
 
31
 Annete Bohr, Nations in Transit 2010 ,Turkmenistan, Freedom House, at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2010/NIT2010Turkmenistanfinal.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011) 
 
32
 Bruce Pannier, Nations in Transit 2010, Uzbekistan, Freedom House, at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2010/NIT2010Uzbekistanfinal2.pdf (accessed march 29, 2011) 
 
33
 Erica Marat, Nations in Transit 2010, Kyrgyzstan,  Freedom House, at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2010/NIT2010Kyrgyzstanfinal1.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011) 
 
 
34
 Robert W. Orttung, Nations in Transit 2010, Russia, Freedom House, at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2010/NIT2010Russiafinal1.pdf (accessed march 29, 2011) 
15 
 
Kazakhstan 128
th
 of 170 countries, with a score of 41.63 points (0 is the perfect score). A 
year later the country improved slightly its score and moved up three positions. Then, the 
situation continued to worsen by each year.  In 2008 Kazakhstan stalled at the same position 
as the previous year; in 2009 the country slipped several places down to 142; in 2010 fell to 
the bottom of the index. Ironically, in the year of the OSCE chairmanship Kazakhstan 
performed the worst: it came 162
nd
 of 178 countries.  
The amendments to the law on media were perceived cautiously by observers. 
Reporters without Borders argues that Kazakhstan “responded to criticism from international 
organizations by promising to bring its legislation on the press in line with international 
standards, but no noticeable changes have taken place”.35  The same opinion is shared by 
Freedom House, which believes that although the Kazakh administration loosened media 
restrictions and removed government registration requirements for broadcast outlets, it 
restricted the legislation for Internet. The human rights watchdog argues that “independent 
media continued to face harassment”36 and government continued to shut down media outlets 
while censorship remained widespread. Tamara Kaleeva, the head of Kazakh media 
watchdog Adil Soz, admitted that although the amendments were rather “cosmetic” they 
were nonetheless “the first amendments in many years that do not worsen the situation of the 
media or journalists”.37 To Human Rights Watch, the amendments consisted of “relatively 
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minor changes” that did little to address core problems and failed to address the broader 
problem with the freedom of media”.38  
    Adil Soz reported 188 incidents of harassment, violence, and intimidation against 
journalists
39
. Relevant examples are Yermek Boltay - contributor to Radio Free Europe - who 
was attacked, and Ramazan Yesergepov - owner and editor-in-chief of the Alma-Ata Info - 
who was sentenced to three years in prison for divulging state secrets.
40
 Reporters without 
Borders criticized Astana for keeping Esergepov in prison and endangering his health, after 
refusing to free him although he qualified for conditional freedom
41
. The government 
tightened its control on media and the number of libel cases against journalists and media 
outlets has risen, as the law prohibits insulting the president and senior officials
42
. In 2009 
Taszhargan ceased publication after being unable to pay a fine of $200,000 to a 
parliamentarian for having insulted the legislative member‟s dignity while weekly 
Respublika had to pay $400,000 to a bank that filed a slender case, in addition to seizing a 
print run of the paper.
43
 
Amendments on the internet reclassified websites as "media outlets” and thus made it 
easier for the authorities to shut them down for alleged violations or for inciting interethnic 
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violence.
44
 Cyber attacks were reported against the opposition-oriented websites zona.kz and 
Respublika.
45
 Reporters without Borders asserted that the websites of Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty were blocked for seven weeks in April and June 2008.
46
 Internet 
providers blocked the platform that hosted Rakhat Aliyev‟s blog, former son-in-law of 
Nazarbayev, where he posted embarrassing disclosures about people within the Kazakh 
administration. Significantly, in spite of all these shortcomings in the freedom of the media, 
“the internet remained freer than print and broadcast media”.47 
According to Sam Patten, Senior Project Manager of Eurasia Program at Freedom 
House, the government amendments did not significantly improve the media. “They did not 
de-criminalize the bill; the civil libel penalty is still there; there was no change on the law on 
internet; and journalists have no privacy and some of them are still imprisoned”, summarizes 
Patten.
48
 Rozlana Taukina, president of Journalists in Distress and Reporters without 
Borders‟ correspondent believes that “the trend is towards more harassment of media that 
criticize and oppose the authorities (….) and the repression is going to increase”.49 
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 Overall, the amendments to laws on elections, political parties, and the media were 
described by Human Rights Watch as “more superficial and pro forma than substantial.”50  
According to Rachel Denber, Europe and Central Asia Director at US-based Human Rights 
Watch, “The disappointing paradox is that Kazakhstan has been very active as OSCE chair 
but took few if any meaningful steps to improve its own human rights record. It could have 
led the OSCE by example, but instead let its human rights records stagnate”.51 
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III. THEORY AND PRACTICE  
 
Introduction 
This section discusses the theoretical framework which consists of two conceptual 
pillars: that of international socialization and of “democracy from outside-in”. The 
socialization theory advocates that membership in certain international organizations can 
change the behavior of member state, thus opening a credible potential democratic transition 
and consolidation. In other words, when a member state interacts with its peer (member 
states within the same organization) the state has a good chance of embracing democratic 
norms and importing them internally with the aim of bringing about positive changes, such 
economic reforms or improving human rights. More specifically, based on the logic of 
appropriateness, interaction among elites can be an efficient instrument for eliciting their 
support for political and economic changes (e.g. EU, NATO). 
 Nonetheless, socialization does not work in the case of the OSCE given two main 
reasons. First, unlike NATO or EU within which elites do interact extensively with each 
other before and after joining membership status, the OSCE does not have the institution 
structure suited for such interaction. Even if it did, the interaction would be limited to 
diplomats, who typically are not involved in making domestic policies so they could not 
impact internal policies. Secondly, the OSCE is a very heterogeneous organization and it 
displays clear East-West geographical, cultural, and political division between the European 
Union states (supported by US and Canada) and the former Soviet republics which are 
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grouped within the umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS).  
Furthermore, the EU bloc is perhaps the main driving force within the organization, whereas 
the CIS bloc forms a group opposing or objecting the decisions whenever Moscow‟s interest 
requires such pressure. In other words, this thesis argues, socialization works efficiently 
when it involves partners of the same principles and exchanges similar values and thus 
allows for an effective domestically assimilation of the international norms. However, the 
OSCE is too diverse to be very effective. 
  
1. Process of Socialization  
Political scientist Brian Greenhill credits international organizations for changing 
their member state behavior through what he calls a “process of socialization”.52 More 
specifically, Greenhill argues that the affiliation with an international organization (IO) and 
the social interaction of the member states can induce member states to change their conduct 
- by internalizing and implementing international norms. In the field of human rights, he 
argues, social interaction with its peers can make a member state to improve its human rights 
record, while providing punishment of non-compliance to those human rights standards to 
which that state had previously adhered. 
According to Greenhill, states follow the “logic of appropriateness” which asserts o 
that socialization should be seen as an incentive for complying with international standards, 
rather than a coercive method. Thus, the author explains, delegates of the member states meet 
through reunions, they exchange views on different matters and learn from each others‟ 
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experience. In other words, Greenhill suggest, there is higher probability that a member state 
will adopt more progressive and democratic policies than they should have done otherwise. 
 
2. Inside -Out Democracy  
 Similarly to Greenhill professor Jon Pevehouse acknowledges the role played by the 
IOs in advancing democracy as well.
53
  He coins “inside out” democracy concept and 
theorizes that IOs can alter the behavior of their member states to the extent of inducing the 
weakening or even the fall of authoritarian regimes that are participating.  According to 
Pevehouse, two factors are driving democratization: 1) membership which lends assurance to 
the military and business elites susceptible of losing their privilege during transition, and 2) 
interstate socialization, which can help reshaping the member‟s values into those compatible 
to democratic practices.  
 Pevehouse argues that regional IOs can leverage transitions to democracy by 
persuading elites to support the path toward political liberalization. Thus, such organizations 
can exert external pressures in several ways: either by public condemnation, by creating 
economic difficulties (imposing economic sanctions), or by diplomatic pressure and 
international isolation aimed at de-legitimizing specific authoritarian regimes. 
For example, an IO can expose certain business to positive aspects of political 
liberalization by creating guarantees credible enough that can assuage their apprehension of 
change. Furthermore, social interaction within an IO can be employed specifically to be 
capable of “altering their systems of beliefs”54. Therefore, facing potentially drastic changes, 
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such as nationalization of land and enterprises, domestic elites decides to resist 
transformation.  Based on rationale calculation, Pevehouse asserts, elites may have an 
apprehensive perception about the changes. It is the case of the EU, for example, where the 
accession brings with it serious economic and regulatory changes that may severely affect 
business environment, such as restructuring the Romanian steel sector. 
Pevehouse argues that the dynamics are relatively similar with the military elites. The 
military fears losing its autonomy and IOs can give them the necessary assurance that the 
changes will not push them away and so they can still benefit of institutional protection. 
Security and defense-oriented organizations (such as NATO) can persuade the military elite 
to support democracy and convince the state leadership to provide adequate resources to its 
military. In some cases, such as NATO, the organization offers incentives in the form of 
financial assistance to military elites. For example, during the pre-accession period the 
candidates undergo a transparent preparation process under the Partnership for Peace, 
throughout which future member states benefit of interaction and cooperation with NATO 
officers and receive financial support, including advanced military equipments and assistance 
training. By socializing amongst each other, the military elites either learn or share the 
experience with their counterparts, thereby internalizing the new doctrines that are conducive 
to democracy. Following this logic, NATO played a major role in pushing for 
democratization in Eastern Europe by demanding the candidate countries to advance drastic 
reforms before accession, such as establishing of a civilian and democratic control over 
military forces and professionalization of armed forces. 
Interestingly, after testing empirically his predictions, Pevehouse concludes that in 
reality not all organizations are effective in advancing democracy and it is likely that small 
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and homogenous structures have a higher likelihood of promoting avenues toward 
democratic transitions. He argues that it is more probable that an organization having a small 
number of like-minded member states that share similar values and interests it is more able to 
influence democratic changes rather than one with a larger number of member states and 
heterogeneous interests. 
 
3. No socialization in OSCE  
Following Greenhill‟s and Pevehouse‟s predictions it is expected that after being for 
almost two decades part of the OSCE
55
, Kazakhstan should have changed its behavior due to 
the positive influence from the majority of the 56 participating states, genuine democracies 
with good human rights records.
56
 Therefore, some of the human rights organizations and 
observers hoped that Kazakhstan will enter the path of democracy and push its human rights 
closer to the international standards. 
There are two reasons why socialization did not work in the case of the OSCE. First, 
the OSCE does not provide the appropriate ground for socialization because its 
organizational design does not allow for elite interactions. Conversely, socialization 
represents a main component of the EU and NATO where member states share similar values 
and interests in the organization, such as furthering democratic progress and promoting 
respect for minorities groups. Even before accession bureaucrats and elites from the 
candidate states interact a great deal with their counterparts from NATO and EU either by 
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travelling extensively to Brussels (the headquarters of both EU and NATO) or by 
participating to trainings and exchange programs. Also, more socialization takes place at 
community levels through twinning programs in which public authorities and civil society 
organizations from the candidate states collaborate with the member states to facilitate the 
transposition, enforcement, and implementation of EU legislation. However, even if the 
OSCE had the appropriate design for socialization, the interaction between the Kazakh 
diplomats and their counterparts from France, Italy, Spain, or Germany, for example, would 
not have influenced Kazakhstan to “import” good democratic “habits” back in their Central 
Asian homeland. Diplomats are not involved in making domestic policies and therefore they 
did not have any say in drafting internal political reforms.  
  Second, the OSCE participating states are not homogenous - there is an obvious East-
West geographical, cultural, and political division within the organization. Geographically 
speaking, the OSCE states are spread over three continents, with the largest number 
represented by European nations. Half of the participating states are EU members while a 
quarter is represented by former Soviet republics, and the rest of them is either hopeful EU 
candidates or small nations without any affiliation. The former Soviet republics are Russian-
speaking nations share common values, history and culture, in addition to close to three 
quarters of century of communism under the Soviet red flag. The structural changes occurred 
in the Post-Soviet era, with few exceptions, did not help the former Soviet republics to 
transition towards genuine democratic societies and hence remained pretty distinct from their 
Western counterparts. Most importantly, with the exception of the Baltic States, the former 
Soviet republics are members of the Russian-led Commonwealth of the Independent States 
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(CIS). The CIS bloc forms a pressure group within the organization whenever Moscow‟s 
interests arise. 
On the other hand, the EU group of states creates, which is less diverse, creates a 
strong bloc within the regional security organization. With half of the participating states 
belonging to the EU, one can say that the OSCE is an EU dominated organization, in spite of 
its inherent freedom of opinion and decision making. In relation to this, Douglas Davidson, 
former US Deputy Representative to the OSCE
57
 explains that usually the individuals EU 
members do not speak separately at the OSCE meetings, but rather present a joint opinion, a 
fact that adds to the still existing clear division within the EU between Eastern and Western 
states. 
In this way, the interaction between the two main blocs inside the OSCE does not 
always employ the same values or mutual interests. Socialization works more efficiently 
when involves partners of the same values and this opens the way for an effective 
domestically assimilation of the international norms. With 56 countries, comprising the EU 
bloc, Russia, CIS countries plus North America, the OSCE is too diffuse to be effective in 
promoting democratic development. 
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IV. OSCE’s LIMITATIONS 
 
       Introduction 
 This section discusses OSCE‟s limitations and structural weaknesses in an attempt to 
explain its inefficiency at eliciting democratic reforms in Kazakhstan. Thus, the two main 
issues are: 1) weakening the organization; the lack of a viable “carrot and stick” mechanism 
that provides for incentives and punishment in the case of non-compliance with the 
standards, and 2) the burden of the consensus-based decision making. As explained earlier, 
the OSCE is not a genuine organization and there are no specific criteria that a state should 
meet in order to join this regional security structure. In turn, thus makes its lack of reward 
and punish instrument even more relevant. Since the OSCE lacks credible incentives, there is 
no punishment for failing to comply with the standards. In fact the most significant gain of 
being a participating state is limited to prestige, therefore, the “name and shame” formula 
would be the most  ”sanction” an OSCE participating state could get.  
By comparison, EU has employed the “carrot and stick” method, which, to certain extent, 
has been successful in bringing democratic developments in Eastern Europe, especially via 
financial incentives provided before and after accession. Furthermore, OSCE‟s consensus-
based decision making has the potential of opening Pandora‟s Box, and thus allowing any of 
its participating states block any unfriendly initiative. This design has worked very well for 
Russia, which for years has been threatening to obstruct many of the OSCE initiatives with 
which Moscow has disagreed. In other words, the question remains: Why the OSCE, an 
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organization that to some extent played a part in tearing down communism in Eastern Europe 
has proved unable to pushing for meaningful reforms in Kazakhstan? In order to investigate 
this issue I am using the example of Charter 77 which exemplifies how the adaptation of the 
OSCE principles represented an ideological weapon in the fight against communist regime in 
Czechoslovakia. Perhaps, the answer could be attributed to the lack of ideological 
antagonism between East and West once the Cold War reached to an end. Today, in the 21
st
 
century countries are more preoccupied with maximizing their economic status by securing 
business opportunities. On the other hand, the attempt of Kazakh civil society to persuade the 
government to comply with the OSCE commitments and advance political reforms has been 
blocked by Kazakhstan‟s authorities because of their inflexibility and unwillingness to 
support considerable changes but also because of fearing that such reforms could have 
weakened their control over Kazakh society. 
 
1.  No ‘Carrot and Stick” and Consensus-Based Decision  
Today, the OSCE is better known for its watchdog role in the areas of human rights, 
media, and election monitoring, rather than for its security or economic dimensions. The 
OSCE‟s principle activity takes place is the field of monitoring elections in former 
communist and Soviet space, where the organization brought attention to the misconduct and 
abuses during the electoral process. For instance, the OSCE experts exposed the 
“irregularities related to voting and voting count”58 during the 2004 parliamentary elections 
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in Belarus and criticized President Alexander Lukashenko for using “fraudulent counting”59 
during the 2010 presidential elections. Further, they have discovered “serious violations”60 of 
the international standards during the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine. As a result, the 
Ukrainian run-off election led to the election of pro-Western opposition leader Viktor 
Yushchenko. 
 Given this, it is safe to assume that over a twenty-year span the OSCE could have 
pressured Kazakhstan into improving its human rights situation, especially within a process 
of promoting a democratic agenda. Moreover, according to Greenhill‟s judgment, the 
organization should have motivated the improvement of freedom of expression, freedom of 
religion, freedom of assembly, or that of Kazakhstan‟s political participation in the country. 
Well, none of these eventually happened. Why not? To better understand the 
stagnation of democratic progress and the country‟s missed opportunity in improving 
political and civil rights I have in mind some of the OSCE‟s institutional flaws which are 
weakening the organization. First, the OSCE is based on the participation of the member 
states and there is no genuine membership as in the case of the EU. Thus, in order to take 
part in the OSCE, the country just needs to signal its agreement with 1975 Helsinki Final 
Act. The Helsinki Final Act was signed on August 1, 1975 by the 35 head of states after two 
years of active engagement and represents a series of political, military, economic, and 
human rights commitments that established the principle for the conduct of the states in 
relation to each other as well as their citizens. The agreement was forged on the “freedom of 
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thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion”61 and provided for equality for national minorities. Since no commitments were 
signed, breaching of these provisions lacks any consequences. In contrast, in the case of the 
EU the “acquis communautaire” (the EU legislation) is legally binding and enforced via 
several treaties the member states had signed before accession, whereas the OSCE 
commitments are only for moral and binding.  
 In the same vein, the OSCE‟s lack of “stick and carrot” mechanism, namely that of 
credible incentive and punishment mechanism leads to blatant non-compliance with the 
standards. Organizations with a clear rewarding and punishing mechanism can employ the 
“carrot and stick” method to sanction member states if they fail to comply with the standards. 
In organizations where the membership is given based on fulfilling strict criteria and where 
member states benefit of financial incentives, failing to comply with these criteria would lead 
to severe political, economic, or social punishment, including losing of the membership. For 
example, the EU whose membership is based on meeting of strict criteria and comes together 
with financial incentives is rather an exception in the world of international organizations. In 
most IOs, including the OSCE, the membership does not entail any rewards other than 
prestige and no punishment for lack of compliance; thus without an institutional 
accountability or punishment mechanism the likelihood of changing state behavior is dismal. 
From this perspective, the only tool the OSCE has in its toolbox is the “name and 
shame” approach, which would translate in publicly exposing and criticizing the abuses a 
participating state is responsible for. The “name and shame” may publicly embarrass the 
                                                          
61
  Helsinki Final Act, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, 1 August 1975, at 
http://www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html (accessed March 19, 2011).  For joining the organization a state has to 
declare its support to the Helsinki Final Act, which till the day remained the guiding principle for organization‟s 
activity. 
30 
 
culprit, but it has a generally weak impact and it is not accompanied by any sanctions. In the 
history of the OSCE, however, there has been just one notable case. In 1992, the former 
Yugoslavia was suspended temporarily from taking part in the organization‟s meetings on 
account of “clear, gross, and uncorrected violation of human dimension of relevant CSCE 
commitments”62 for fomenting the war in Bosnia. To this date, it was the first and only time 
the organization employed a ”consensus minus one”63 decision making approach and 
according to Douglas Davidson, former US Deputy Representative to the OSCE in Vienna, 
Russia has made it clear that “this will not happen again.” 64 
Nevertheless, this institutional arrangement that demands a consensus-based decision 
making constitutes a substantial impediment. In supporting this argument, a Freedom House 
document notes that, “because the OSCE is a consensus-based organization, there is a limit to 
the ability of any group of participating states to force changes that others strongly oppose.”65 
This way, any of the participating states could attempt to block undesired initiatives. As a 
relevant case, Russia had unreasonable restrictions on the Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (ODIHR)
66
 and consequently the OSCE ended up not sending any 
observers to Russia‟s 2007 parliamentary and 2008 presidential elections. The Chechen 
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episode when the OSCE was forced to leave from the Northern Caucasus republic is another 
example that highlights the limitations on the OSCE‟s consensus based decisions 67 “Because 
the OSCE is a consensus organization“, explained the OSCE spokesman Richard Murphy, 
the organization‟s failure in the Chechen case “in which all 55 countries have to agree, there 
was no agreement, which means the mission will automatically lapse”. 68  
  Paradoxically, it looks that during the Cold War the OSCE had, in fact, reached few 
key agreements concerning  political and security issues, such as the Conference of the 
Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe 1984
69
 and the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 1990.
70
 A notable post-Cold War 
achievement was, however, the 1999 Kosovo Verification Mission during the war in Kosovo, 
the first and largest field based operation undertaken by the OSCE, consisting in 2,000 
unarmed monitors whose job was to observe the cease fire and assist international 
organizations with the return of refugees.
71
 Nonetheless, one of the OSCE‟s main 
achievements is its contribution to providing ideological support to dissident movements in 
Eastern Europe. From this perspective, answering why the organization did not have the 
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same impact on Kazakhstan as it did in 1989 Eastern Europe change of regime remains an 
intriguing question to be investigated further. 
  
2.  Why the OSCE is not the EU 
  Among all the regional organizations, the EU proved to be the most successful in 
promoting democracy through integration in former communist countries. According to 
European scholars Antoaneta Dimitrova and Geoffrey Pridham, the model for promoting 
democratic values employed by the EU is “the top down of conditionality and the carrot of 
membership”, whereas the OSCE combines bottom-up and top-down mechanism, using the 
tools of consultation, persuasion, and electoral monitoring, and with no genuine carrot.
72
 In 
contrast to the OSCE, the EU applies to a large spectrum of areas of governance and 
institutions and thus covers numerous policies. In addition to that, the EU has weighted 
voting, whereas in the OSCE the decisions are based on consensus, with the exception of 
human rights violations, where a consensus minus one can be employed. 
 Unlike the OSCE, the EU offers viable political and economic benefits to its member 
states, but also imposes certain requirements, before and after accession. For instance, in 
order to be considered a credible candidate, a state must meet the “Copenhagen Criteria” of 
political and economic requirements related to democratic institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, free elections, respect and protection of minorities, and market economy.
73
 The 
pre-accession process follows the”top down conditionality” approach which calls for serious 
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institutional, political, social, and economic transformations, including adjusting its internal 
legislation to the Union‟s. The candidate negotiates a number of chapters with regard to the 
EU policies and during these negotiations they need to adjust its policies and legislation in 
order to match the European regulations and standards. 
 The financial compensations are perhaps the most appealing incentives. Candidates 
and member states receive billions of Euros in order to overcome the economic gap between 
the two groups of states.
74
 The accountability factor, however, is present both during and 
after accession period. Thus, before accession a candidate is evaluated for its performance 
through annual monitoring reports and it can lose the financial aid if does not perform well, 
while after accession a member can still lose the money and face the infringement procedure 
if it violates the EU legislation. Although it does not provide any financial incentives to the 
participating states, the OSCE require its participating states to pay an annual contribution to 
their organization‟s budget75. For instance, the 2011 EU budget is over EUR 126 billions76, 
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whereas the OSCE budget for 2010 amounted to EUR 150 millions 
77
 which reflects the 
countries‟ contributions.78  
In the 1990s the EU expanded its democratic agenda and became increasingly active 
in the area of human rights.
79
 By analogy, it is more likely that those countries that are both 
OSCE and EU members are more democratic than the ones which are just OSCE 
participating states. The EU is more aggressive than the OSCE in making a candidate to 
adhere to the democratic standards. In some cases, like Romania and Bulgaria, the EU 
membership made a difference in contributing significantly to democracy promotion as the 
changes imposed by Brussels pushed toward development probably much faster than it 
would have otherwise. 
This context implies that the OSCE faces an indirect obstruction: its democratization 
mission has been overlapped by the EU and NATO, both promoting democracy including 
human rights. The OSCE participating states from the European former communist countries, 
who are members of both NATO and EU, had a better chance to embrace democratic values 
than former Soviet Union republics (other than the Baltic states). For Eastern European 
countries the pressure for changes has come from different directions while the constraints on 
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the member states have been complemented by concrete incentives. This way, it is likely that 
the OSCE had contributed, to certain extent, to democratic progress in Eastern Europe, but it 
did not have the same impact in relation to the former Soviet republics, which remained more 
or less under Russian influence. 
 
3. Paradox: Yes to the Fall of Communism, no to Kazakhstan 
  The OSCE has been recognized as one of the actors responsible for inspiring the 
civil society in Eastern socialist bloc to mobilize against the communist regime. The paradox 
is why the OSCE, at that time Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
had an impact on the civil society during an era of severe constraints but failed bring 
democracy in Kazakhstan in a period of time when the political and social environment have 
posed fewer risks and limitations than three decades ago. Thus, civil societies in communist 
countries have embraced the human rights freedoms of the CSCE‟s Third Basket and, 
empowered by these principles, they have been inspired to start up a movement against the 
regime that eventually changed the course of history and, conversely, the same values did not 
call for similar actions in Kazakhstan, especially since the current political context is 
different. In socialist regimes opposition and civil society activists were forced to function 
under constraints and in several occasions they faced ruthless oppression, including physical 
extermination, whereas, in Kazakhstan despite authorities‟ infringements and limitations civil 
society activists do function in a friendlier environment than their peers. This begs the 
question why the CSCE/OSCE worked well for the Czechoslovakian dissidents, for instance, 
and did not in relation to Kazakhstan?  
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 Charter 77 was a civic initiative that emerged in the 1970s in Czechoslovakia and it 
represented one of the most leading statements against totalitarianism. The movement 
partially emerged in response to the arrest of psychedelic rock band Plastic People of the 
Universe for holding a rock concert
80
. The document was published on January 6, 1977 in 
Czechoslovakia and the next day published in Western newspapers and transmitted to both 
Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. Political dissident Vaclav Havel, who later 
became president of Czechoslovakia, was among the founding members. The document, 
which was initially signed by several hundreds of intellectuals and civil society activists 
representative of various political viewpoints, religions and occupations criticized the 
communist government for failing to implement the human rights provisions of numerous 
documents that Czechoslovakia had signed, including the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
81
, 
and the Helsinki Final Act. 
  Limited to the Czechoslovakian law, which banned any opposition political activity, 
The Charter sought to "to engage in a constructive dialogue with political and state power by 
drawing attention to various specific instances of violations of human and civil rights, to 
document them, and to propose solutions”.82  The document, truly an ideological weapon 
demanding compliance with Western human rights norms, took the Helsinki Final Act for its 
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word and called for an intellectual rebellion against Czechoslovakian totalitarianism. More 
specifically, the Charter advocated in favors of human rights and human freedoms within the 
communist countries and cross nationally. More specifically, it referred to Principle VII of 
the Helsinki Final Act that asked the participating states to show “respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or 
belief".
83
 This way, Czechoslovakian dissidents used the Helsinki Final Act as a tool in order 
to fight the communist regime within a legal framework.  
Evidently, the text of the Charter 77 was illegal because the Czechoslovakian 
Communist Party perceived it as “an anti-state, anti-socialist, anti-people and demagogic 
squib”84. Disseminating contents of the document was deemed a political crime and as a 
result, retaliation ensued.  Most of its signers lost their employment, were denied, had their 
driving license suspended, or naturally, were imprisoned.  
The communist regime raised, unintentionally, awareness on the movement by 
organizing an anti-campaign against the Charter
85
. The government anti-campaign helped the 
organization gain notoriety. The oppression against the Charter‟s signatories generated a 
support group, namely, The Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (Výbor na 
obranu nespravedlivě stíhaných)86, which made public facts about the fate of those associated 
with the Charter. Thus the government sponsored anti- Charter movement was not very 
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effective since “signatories were not intimidated by the campaign and people showed no 
anger against the Charter.
87
 Moreover, the Charter has become the “focus of Czechoslovak 
politics.”88 Hence, in the1980s Charter members became more involved in organizing the 
opposition against the communist establishment thereby generating the so called “1989 
Velvet Revolution”. During this period they managed to negotiate a smooth transfer of 
political power from dictatorship to democracy, which in turn led the collapse of the 
communist regime. 
 Charter 77 movement must be understood in the broader context following the 
Prague Spring - a period of liberalization that was started by reformist Alexander Dubcek in 
January 1968 and lasted until August 21, when the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact allies 
(minus Romania) invaded the country to curb the anti-communist reforms
89
.  For instance, 
Petruška Šustrová, signatory and spokeswoman of Charter 7790 believes that the legacy of the 
Prague Spring and its atmosphere of  ”freedom, trust, and exchange of views”91 inspired the 
Czechoslovakian society immediately and thereafter the 1968 events.  Furthermore, Anna 
Sabatova, another Charter 77 signatory, testifies that it represented the consequence of “the 
emotions of 1968 and of the international legal architecture that emerged in the wake of those 
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tumultuous events”92 . “Most of those of us who signed it were driven by our feelings 
stemming from those days”93 , explains Sabatova. She believes that a crucial element leading 
to the development and promotion of Charter 77 has to do with the new climate in Europe, 
which changed once the OSCE/CSCE has become the official monitoring in relation to 
human rights and proclaimed its support for human rights organization. According to 
Sabatova, one of Charter‟s 77 lessons for activists is its broad membership, namely its 
encompassing spectrum of its adherents. As stated above, the movement brought together 
people of diverse backgrounds, politicians of various ideologies (conservatives, democrats, 
and liberals, revolutionary Marxists). It even appealed to those who had been expelled from 
the Communist Party after 1968 - “who had tried to reform the totalitarian state from within 
during the heady days of the Prague Spring”; 94 to atheists and Christians but also artists, 
writers, and laborers.
95
 
Today‟s political context Kazakhstan context is different than it was three decades 
ago in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps one of the reasons for the OSCE‟s inability to play a more 
significant role in Kazakhstan could be attributed to the lack of ideological antagonism 
between the East and West. During the Cold War the Western bloc was involved in an 
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ideological competition with the Soviet Union and supported the anti-communist dissident 
movements. Nowadays, Western countries are more preoccupied with identifying new 
economic opportunities to enhance their partnership with Kazakhstan and therefore pay less 
attention to the differences among them and the Central Asian nations. 
On the other hand, Kazakhstan‟s civil society is different from the one three decades 
ago in Czechoslovakia, where Charter 77 benefited of Prague Spring‟s legacy and was 
influenced by the environment following the tumultuous 1968 events. Although subject to 
various pressures from Kazakh authorities, civil society groups managed to be quite pro-
active in taking stands against government policies and advocating for reforms. However, 
they have been divided over supporting Kazakhstan‟s bid for the OSCE chairmanship. While 
many of NGOs believed that the chairmanship would be nothing but an opportunity for 
president Nazarbayev to consolidating power, few organizations supported Astana‟s bid to 
chair the OSCE hoping that  ”the pride of one-year chairmanship would inspire human rights 
improvements”96.   
Among its supporters was Yevghenyi Zhovtis, a renowned human rights activist and 
head of Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, who hoped that 
the chairmanship would trigger political reforms, particularly after the country‟s pledges in 
anticipation of the chairmanship. According to The Economist, Zhovtis “believed at the time 
there was little else left that could push a country with a one-party parliament and growing 
oil exports towards change”. 97 Zhovtis‟ disappointment was even greater when, just few 
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months before Kazakhstan taking over the chairmanship, he was imprisoned for vehicular 
manslaughter without due process.  
Another supporter of the chairmanship was Nazarbayev‟s former son-in-law and 
former ambassador to the OSCE, Rakhat Aliyev, who turned into the President‟s enemy 
since 2007. In an open letter to the OSCE participating states and international human rights 
organizations, he expressed regrets for supporting Kazakhstan‟s bid and complained that the 
“government has for the most part ignored recommendations on the substance of the 
reform”.98 Furthermore, he asked the OSCE participating states to openly recognize “that 
they made a terrible mistake at the Madrid OSCE Ministerial Council being consented to 
give the Kazakh Regime an opportunity to lead this respectful international organization”99.  
In fact, Kazakh civil society organizations demanded repeatedly that the government 
comply with both the OSCE and Madrid Commitments. Even more, Kazakh government 
compliance with the OSCE and Madrid Commitments has been scrutinized by local NGOs 
both before and during the chairmanship. For instance, Kazakhstan International Bureau for 
Human Rights and Rule of Law, International Foundation for the Freedom of Speech “Adil 
Soz”, Ecological Association “Green Salvation”, Legal Policy Research Center, Public 
Policy Research Center, Public Foundation “Charter for Human Rights”, and Almaty 
Helsinki Committee - prepared a document about Kazakhstan‟s compliance with the OSCE 
commitments on democracy in the wake of the OSCE chairmanship
100
. 
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In order to fulfill its political and civil rights pledges several Kazakh NGOs working 
groups focused on legislative change and put forward joint proposals related to political and 
civil rights. For instance, Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of 
Law, Charter for Human Rights, and the National Network of Independent Monitors, 
together with Kazakhstan‟s leading opposition part, Azat, participated in the working group 
of the Kazakh Central Electoral Commission in order to discuss the reform on electoral 
process and made recommendations on the draft law.
101
 In few cases, the government has 
taken into consideration the NGOs proposals, whereas in other instances the authorities 
ignored civil society recommendations. 
  Although Kazakh civil society embraced the OSCE principles and used them to 
demand compliance with international standards, it proved to be unable to be a changing 
force. At the end of the day civil society‟s failure to persuade the government to advance 
reforms could be attributed mainly to Nazarbayev‟s strong leadership and his near total 
control of Kazakh politics, legislative, and judiciary branches. Kazakh authorities remained 
unresponsive to the several public demands from the NGOs to further significant democratic 
reforms.   
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V.  KAZAKHSTAN – NATURAL RESOURCES BUT NO DEMOCRACY 
 
Introduction 
 This section will tackle the second major cause for Kazakhstan‟s failure to improving 
civil and political rights, the Central Asian nation itself, the leadership, opposition, and civil 
society. 
 A former Soviet republic, today‟s Kazakhstan is roughly of the size of Western 
Europe, and one of the world‟s major holders of oil, gas, and minerals. A predominantly 
Muslim country with a large Russian ethnic group, Kazakhstan is by far the most developed 
Central Asian economy, largely because of the extractive industry of oil and gas. With a 
constant economic growth in the past decade and benefitting of an extraordinary geo-
strategic position between two of the global powers, Russia and China, Kazakhstan has made 
it attractive to both Russia and United States which poured massive investments in its 
extractive industry. Today, oil and gas products represent more than half of its exports and 
Kazakh oil is one the major suppliers of the European and Russian markets. This section will 
look more onto how the external factors and internal conditions have constituted an obstacle 
for furthering democracy and improving human rights. Among these are the country‟s geo-
strategic factor, its vast natural resources, and internal political situation, along with the 
proximity to Russia.  
44 
 
Twenty years after independence, Kazakhstan is not model democracy, since there is no 
parliamentary opposition and the civil society is striving to overcome the constant pressure 
from the authorities. However, Western democracies have turned a blind eye on human rights 
violations and continue doing profitable business in the region by exploiting the Central 
Asian‟s nation enormous natural resources. In addition, the country„s geo-strategic position 
at the crossroad of two major powers and a number of Western interests makes Kazakhstan 
to be seen a desirable strategic partner in the region for both western and eastern nations. Not 
in the least, the proximity to Russia and the close political and economic links between 
Astana and Moscow does not give too much room for Kazakhstan to make an effort deliver 
democratic reforms, as Russia would rather have a likeminded neighbor abiding to the 
peculiar Russian democracy than to Western values. At the end of the day, the combination 
of these four elements proved to be a non-incentive for Kazakhstan to change its behavior. 
 
1. The Natural Resources Factor 
Perhaps the main reason Kazakhstan had not followed through with democratic 
progress relates to its nature of its oil-based economy. As a result, president Nazarbayev has 
not had any credible incentives in order to move the status quo toward democratization. At 
the same time, Western powers also hesitated to apply substantial pressure, being content to 
maintain advantageous economic relations with Astana. More specifically, Western, Russian, 
and Chinese companies have all profited extensively from doing business with Kazakh oil 
and gas. Among major investments it worth mention the pipelines connecting Russia by the 
Novosibirsk at the Black Sea, the Western-sponsored Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline aimed 
lessen the dependence on Russia as a transit country, or the pipelines connecting China. 
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According to the NPR (National Public Radio), “American oil companies are the biggest 
players in Kazakhstan, with more than $13 billion invested”.102 Today oil and gas products 
represent more than half of the country‟s exports and Kazakh oil is one of the major suppliers 
of both European and Russian markets.  
Evidently, the lack of democratic progress is a result of both sides‟ rational 
calculations: they have basically weighted their economic interests versus acting in response 
to violation of human rights. None of the Western state, including the US, would jeopardize 
their economic interests and take a critical stance just because Astana continues to register 
low scored on human rights or does little to advance democracy.  
Hence, the Kazakh leadership has not faced any pressure significant enough to shift 
values and attitudes, and thus improve its human rights records. As such, Kazakhstan failed 
to fulfill the political commitments made during the 2007 OSCE Ministerial Council in 
Madrid, when Astana was chosen to chair the organization in 2010.
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2. The Geo-Strategic Factor 
Kazakhstan‟s unique position between the world‟s two big powers and in the 
immediate vicinity of a several nuclear powers (Russia, China, India, Pakistan), in addition to 
the relative geographical proximity to Afghanistan, makes Kazakhstan a strategic partner. 
From this perspective Nazarbayev‟s twenty years of dominant leadership has had substantial 
influence: a factor of political stability in the region which prevented the country fall under 
violent confrontations, unlike in neighboring Kyrgyzstan
103
 and Tajikistan.
104
 Nazarbayev 
made great efforts to introduce Kazakhstan as a reliable regional player, and from this 
perspective, the international community are expecting Astana play a key role in maintaining 
the security and stability in this volatile region. 
The geo-strategic card plays a crucial role for the US-Kazakhstan relation, as both 
countries enjoy a long term strategic partnership. In fact, Astana was the first Central Asian 
country that had offered assistance to the US following the 9/11 attacks and later on 
supported the US-led coalition in Iraq. After the US closed its military base in Kyrgyzstan at 
Manas (which was a crucial base for coalition military operations in Afghanistan), 
Washington is seeking seeks another friendly state in the region to host its bases and 
Kazakhstan may be a candidate. For now, Astana and Washington have an agreement under 
which Kazakhstan allows US planes to fly across its domestic air space to supply military 
equipment to American forces deployed in Afghanistan. The two countries also enjoy a 
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significant cooperation in security and non-proliferation area. Kazakhstan had renounced 
nuclear weapons in 1993 and the US has assisted with the removal of nuclear warheads
105
. 
Nonetheless, Kazakhstan enjoys strong ties with NATO and is a member of both the 
European Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, a framework under which is 
annually holding joint peacekeeping exercises with the member states of the Euro-Atlantic 
military organization.
106
 
The US has not been very supportive of Kazakhstan‟s bid to the OSCE chairmanship 
because of the country‟s poor political and civil rights records and requested a review session 
from the Human Rights Council of the United Nations. However, at the end of the day 
Washington seemed to turn a blind eye on the outcome of the chairmanship. Although 
President Barack Obama did not participate at the summit in Astana and sent Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton instead, many observers argue that she has not been very critical to the 
lack of reforms implemented by Kazakh government in connection to the Madrid 
Commitments. One more time, geo-strategic and economic interests have prevailed over 
human rights.  
 
 
3. The Russia Factor 
The third external factor to be considered determining Kazakhstan‟s poor 
performance in the human rights areas is Russia and the remaining close ties to Moscow, in 
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spite of the formal independence gained in 1991. Remaining in Russian sphere of influence, 
Astana has constantly collaborated with Moscow in the Commonwealth of the Independent 
States (CIS), the most significant cooperation structures involving former Soviet republics 
and in which Russia has a dominant role, and in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, 
a regional security and cooperation mechanism capable of advancing joint military 
capabilities
107
. More significantly, Russia is Kazakhstan‟s major trade partner, holding a little 
over a quarter of Central Asian nation‟s overall imports (while the largest export partner is 
China). 
 With an increasingly centralized political system that is concentrated around the 
presidency, still under Putin‟s influence, and with a weak multiparty system clearly 
dominated by Russia United (supporting the president), Russia falls short from any ideal of 
democracy. Nonetheless, the OSCE has exposed repeatedly serious misconduct and abuses in 
the past Russian legislative elections
108
 and human rights organization constantly criticize 
Moscow for increasing control on the civil society. As Russia is not regarded as the forefront 
for human rights, Moscow does not have an interest watching democracy flourishing in 
Kazakhstan. For example, a Washington D.C.-based expert put it, while referring to Russia‟s 
presence in the OSCE, that of a “wolf among sheep” and “it is more likely that the wolf will 
try to change the sheep‟s behavior, and not the other way around.” 
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4. The Authoritarian Rule and Weak Opposition Factor 
Nevertheless, the most important issue pertains to Nazarbayev‟s strong leadership and 
efforts opposition and civil society undertake to elicit tangible democratic changes. 
Kazakhstan is far from a democracy, is a “presidential republic”, which displays strong 
features of an authoritarian regime. Thus, Nazarbayev is the former General-Secretary of the 
Kazakh Communist Party and the only Kazakh president that held power after the 1991 
independence from the Soviet Union. Observers note that throughout these years he had 
developed quite a personality cult. For instance, in 2010 the Kazakh Parliament passed a law 
which awarded Nazarbayev with the title “Father of the Nation“ that gives him and his 
family lifetime immunity from criminal prosecution upon leaving office
109
. Even more, 
Nazarbayev‟s birthday has been declared Astana Day, via official legislation110 
 Therefore, Kazakhstan has been nothing else, but “a strong and personalized 
presidential system by extending his patronage over the key political institutions, media 
outlets, the judiciary, executive bodies, and the business sector by offering considerable 
rewards to entrepreneurs, professionals, and technocrats in exchange for their loyalty and 
support”111. Although Nazarbayev rhetorically advocates for democracy, in fact he is afraid 
that a drastic change may harm both Kazakhstan‟s political stability of the country and 
jeopardize its economic development.  However, despite its economic wellbeing and its close 
ties to many Western nations, Kazakhstan stands out in many reports for abuses and 
                                                          
109
 Rayhan Demytrie, “Kazakhstan seeks image boost from OSCE summit” , BBC  News, November 30, 2010,  at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11880257 (accessed December 5, 2010) 
 
110
 Alexandr Bokatik, “Kazakhstan‟s glorification of Nazarbayev reaches new height”, Central Asia Online, 
July 5, 2010, at 
http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en_GB/features/caii/features/main/2010/07/05/feature-01  
(accessed April 3, 2011) 
111
 Bhavna Dave,  Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2010, Kazakhstan, at 
http://www.freedomhouse.eu/images/Reports/NIT-2010-Kazakhstan-final-final.pdf (accessed March 6, 2011) 
 
50 
 
violations of human rights, especially those related to freedom of media, freedom of religion, 
freedom of assembly, torture, political participation.   
 Currently, there is no opposition party represented in the Parliament, as none of the 
opposition parties were able to cross the seven percent electoral threshold to make it to the 
legislative branch. In the last 2007 election the presidential party Nur-Otan (named after 
Nazarbayev, which follows the Russian model introduced by Vladimir Putin and his party, 
Russia United) won all the seats via party list. “A personality cult centered on the president 
has only intensified since Nazarbayev, according to official results, secured 91 percent of the 
vote in the 2005 presidential election”, notes a Freedom House report.112 
Lacking representation in the Parliament and facing constant persecution and 
pressure, opposition parties and Nazarbayev‟s opponents struggled hard to elicit effective 
democratic transformation of the country. Although Kazakh civil society is active and 
advocates for democratic development it does not have the necessary capacity or the tools to 
leverage towards visible adjustments closer to western values. 
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VI. CHOOSING KAZAKHSTAN – THE BATTLE BEHIND THE 
SCENE 
 
 Introduction 
This section discusses how Kazakhstan managed to be chosen to chair the 2010 
chairmanship of the OSCE and the reasons behind the selection in spite of its poor human 
rights record. The chairmanship came as a compromise offered to Russia to appease long 
time discontent between the Eastern and Western groups of states within the organization.  
After an unsuccessful attempt in the mid-1990s to transform the organization into the 
most important European security structure and thus block NATO enlargement in the 
region,
113
 Russia began voicing its dissatisfaction with the core activities of the OSCE. 
Moscow complained that the OSCE focused too much on democracy and human rights  
issues, while neglecting the economic and security dimensions, and that it paid a greater- 
attention to the developments east of Vienna, namely in post-Soviet society and ignoring the 
human rights violations in Western countries and their allies.  
The under-representation of the East bloc in the OSCE institutions and field missions, 
headed by Western and Americans diplomats, represented another area that prompted harsh 
complaints. Additionally, repeatedly Moscow threatened to block the OSCE budget for field 
missions, which Russia threatened to obstruct it unless Russian-back reforms were 
considered.  
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 In this context Kazakhstan was the ideal candidate which satisfy the Eastern bloc 
demands since it was the most developed of the Central Asian nations and its politics were 
the least repressive. 
After a couple of years of sustained campaigning conducted by the Kazakh 
establishment, combined with pledges to deliver democratic reforms and Russian lobby, 
Astana received the OSCE chairmanship for 2010. This decision appeased Russia and was 
seen by observers as an extended a hand to the East bloc. 
 
 
1. A Compromise for Russia’s Sake 
Choosing Kazakhstan to chair the 2010 chairmanship of the OSCE raised many eye 
brows regarding Astana‟s capacity to deliver on human rights promises and strengthen the 
organization. The choice of the Central Asian nation was intended to appease the tensions 
existing between the Western and Eastern blocs within the organization, since the Eastern 
group led by Russia had complained for several years that the OSCE was focusing on human 
rights violations east of Vienna and less attentive to economic and security issues. Moscow 
was upset that OSCE was more concerned with strengthening democracy in former Soviet 
republics and had been extensively involved in election monitoring as to disclose electoral 
misconduct
114
.  
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According to Russian affairs expert Vladimir Socor, Moscow argued that the OSCE 
activities are “doubly imbalanced”; on the one hand, “focusing selectively on democracy 
issues while neglecting all-European military-security issues”115, and on the other hand, 
targeting only political developments in post-Soviet countries “while ignoring the flawed 
elections and human-rights violations in Western countries and their new allies.” 
Russia‟s discontent with the OSCE dates back to the 1990s when Moscow failed in its 
efforts to prevent NATO enlargement to Eastern Europe and the Baltic region because it had 
envisioned the OSCE would become the main security organization in the region and an 
alternative to NATO. “Moscow believed that OSCE could become a significant security wing 
to cover Europe and Central Asia, with countries like Romania, Turkey Russia, Georgia, and 
Moldova. NATO would not have been necessary anymore and why then to extend the Euro-
Atlantic military alliance?” observes Douglas Davidson.116 
On the other hand, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States members 
have been dissatisfied with the OSCE criticism of elections in former Soviet republics. For 
instance, in 2004 they expressed their discontent in a statement that has accused the OSCE of 
”not respecting the national sovereignty and internal affairs of the countries in which it 
operates”117. 
Subsequently, Russia complained about the under-representation of the Eastern bloc 
in the OSCE institutions as well. Most of the organization‟s offices and missions, including 
                                                          
115
 Vladimir Socor, “OSCE reform or a new lease on life”,  Eurasia Daily Monitor , Volume: 1 Issue: 148, at 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=27303&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid
%5D=175&no_cache=1 (accessed February 28, 2011) 
 
116
 Discussion with Douglas Davidson, former US Deputy Representative to OSCE in Vienna, on December 6, 
2010, Washington D.C. 
 
117
 Roland Eggleston,“OSCE: Election Experts Debate Russian Criticism”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
April 22, 2005, at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058603.html (accessed March 29, 2011) 
 
54 
 
election monitoring missions, are headed by US and Western diplomats. Given that, Moscow 
has advocated for equal positions for the representatives from the Eastern bloc.     
Another major battlefield was the OSCE budget. In 2004 Russia moved to block the 
2005 budget funding necessary for the field missions, unless the organization would 
introduce Russian backed reforms and shift its focus on the economic and security 
dimensions. 
This was in fact the environment in which Russia demanded a sympathetic candidate, 
while at the same time Russia was too skillfully not to push for its own candidacy
118
. Russia 
sought suitors from the Eastern bloc and Kazakhstan seemed to be the perfect candidate for 
the job.  Many would argue that Kazakhstan was actually the only alternative, since it was the 
most developed among the Central Asian countries and its politics were the least repressive. 
At the same time, Kazakhstan has conducted a tireless campaign to convince the 
OSCE participating states that it deserves to chair the organization. In fact, Kazakhstan 
aimed at chairing the organization in 2009, but the delay with a year was partly because of 
the concerns raised by the United States about “how stoutly Kazakhstan would uphold the 
OSCE‟s core commitment to democracy and human rights”.119 Kazakhstan has been given 
more time until 2010 to amend the legislation aimed at improving the human rights 
framework in the country. 
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Members of the Kazakh establishment conducted a “relentless campaign …to raise its 
international profile through a mix of diplomacy, intense public-relations activities.
120
 
Kazakhstan‟s main argument in support of its bid was that it would be capable of healing the 
growing rift within the organization, but also that it would take the necessary steps to 
improve the country‟s civil and political rights framework. 
According to a document prepared by Freedom House and local Kazakh NGOs a 
significant factor  in favor of Astana‟s candidacy was “the fear of creating an even larger 
split within the organization should Kazakhstan not be granted the chairmanship”.121 
Lastly, another factor leading to the Kazakh leadership of the OSCE was its pledges 
made at the 2007 Ministerial Council in Madrid where Kazakhstan was chosen to chair the 
organization. The Kazakh Minister of Foreign Affairs Marat Tazhin delivered a speech in 
which he laid down plans for the country‟s further democratic progress and promised that his 
country would take the necessary steps to undergo significant political reforms in the field of 
media, the political participation, and electoral processes. 
In this way, Kazakhstan‟s selection to the OSCE chairmanship satisfied the Eastern 
bloc demands and, at the same time, quelling some of Russia‟s complaints. At the end, it 
looked like a hand extended to the East in the aim of bridging the gap between the Eastern 
and Western blocs. 
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However, several experts argue that due to its poor human rights record, the Kazakh 
chairmanship was perceived as a risk of devaluating the organization‟s efforts in the human 
rights field.
  
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Astana summit ended on December 2, 2010 and so too did Kazakhstan‟s one 
year chairmanship of the OSCE. Many argue that both the chairmanship and the summit 
were nothing but a “foreign policy advertisement”, as political analyst Dosym Satpayev122 
put it, and the chairmanship did not produce the expected changes. No real progress has been 
achieved in terms of democratic reforms since Kazakh authorities did not fulfill the pledges 
they made in Madrid with regard to political and civil rights. Observers argue that, at best, 
the human rights situation stagnated if not deteriorated and from this perspective the 
chairmanship was a “failure”. Moreover, there is no guarantee that reforms will take place in 
the near future. Observers believe that by achieving this major foreign policy goal of having 
Kazakhstan chairing as the OSCE Nazarbayev is no longer concerned with domestic and 
international criticism and hence he will not respond to any external pressure for addressing 
the human rights question. However, one could argue that fundamental changes do not 
happen overnight and it takes long time for results to be seen, especially when the 
transformations concern Soviet-model based societies which have never been highly rated on 
human rights
123
. 
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The chairmanship provided an opportunity for highlighting certain realities about 
Kazakhstan and the OSCE. It has again emphasized, if needed, on the OSCE‟s limitations in 
taking actions against those participating states that do not fulfill their commitment, in 
addition to highlighting the burdensome given the consensus-based decision making process. 
From this perspective, the OSCE is hardly very efficient, which makes Professor Stephen 
Blank bluntly stated that “today OSCE is a paralyzed organization”124.   
The OSCE does not have the capacity to influence or promote major changes, at least 
not in non-democratic regimes, other than exposing unsatisfactory electoral conduct. Given 
its institutional weakness, one could say that the OSCE‟s role is more or less constrained just 
to bringing a wide array of states together for discussion but with no major policy or 
behavioral changes. 
Although the Madrid Commitments enjoyed a certain domestic reverberation before 
and after the chairmanship and Kazakh civil society may had used the organization‟s 
principles to demand the government comply with its pledges made improve human rights 
situation, the OSCE failed to be a catalyst for democratization. Local civil society actors 
raised awareness on the need to abide by the international commitments the country had 
agreed upon and on how to implement international standards. They also criticized the 
government when it failed to do so. However, it looked like their actions had no considerably 
effect on the performances of the Kazakh leadership. 
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At least for the time being, it is obvious that economic interests continue to prevail 
over other issues and Western nations will employ a double standard when dealing with 
human rights. While rhetorically would champion for human rights and would send out 
messages about necessity of complying with the international standards, the Western nations 
seem to be more concerned about securing access to Kazakh natural resources. For example, 
in July 2010 Royal Dutch Shell signed an agreement with KazMunaiGas - the Kazakh state-
owned gas and oil company - to jointly manage production at the Kashagan oil field in the 
Caspian Sea
125
.  
Although the chairmanship “has not changed the basis for Kazakhstan with regard to 
democracy, at least not in the short term”, as Douglas Davidson argues, it nevertheless 
achieved international publicity for the Central Asian state. If Nazarbayev‟s intention was to 
show the world that Kazakhstan could be a regional player then he surely did. Some experts 
deem Kazakhstan prepared in taking up more significant roles in the near future, such as 
providing support to the US in persuading regional nuclear powers, like India and Pakistan, 
to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
126
 
   Overall, two things remains certain: 1) until the organization undergoes an 
institutional transformation and improves its capacity to address the non-compliance with its 
standards one should not expect the OSCE to produce miracles in changing the behavior of 
its less democratic participating states; and 2) regardless of lack of democratic reforms or 
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human rights abuses, Kazakhstan and Western countries will continue enjoy a close 
cooperation driven by regional security concerns and preservation of access to the country‟s 
immense natural resources. 
It looks like Kazakhstan‟s approach in conducting the country‟s affairs is guided by 
the principle “economics first, politics second”. As a Kazakh official put it, ”we, in 
Kazakhstan, believe that you can't build a democracy on an empty stomach”.127 Sadly, as 
long as this motto remains the basis of Kazakh model of governance and the country 
continues to neglect compliance with international standards, Kazakhstan‟s chances of 
democratization remain rather dismal. 
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APPENDIX  
 
 
What Do Experts Say? 
 
 
Several OSCE and Central Asian experts, as well as human rights activists have 
expressed their opinions on the relation on Kazakh chairmanship and its influence on 
democratic change. As noted above, many of the ideas, as reflected in the interviews I have 
conducted, have been incorporated in this thesis. 
 
“Kazakhstan wanted to show that holding the chairmanship and organizing the first 
summit in 11 years proved the country‟s capabilities to play as a world class leader and that it 
is being responsible to deal with international issues,” said Douglas Davidson, the former US 
Deputy Representative to the OSCE in Vienna.
128
 However, the summit did not produce a 
very significant document and it did not achieve the level of the 2001Bucharest Ministerial 
Council, which, in Douglas Davidson‟s opinion, was the most successful recent summit to 
produce a notable political declaration.
129
 In comparison, little has been accomplished at 
Astana summit. “The promise Kazakhstan has made has no consequences, as Astana failed to 
deliver on these promises”, explained Douglas Davidson. For him the failure of the 
chairmanship and of the summit “was partially because of the failure of Kazakhstan to 
deliver on human rights and fulfill the promises made in Madrid”, argued the US diplomat.
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“Overall, the membership has not changed the basic for Kazakhstan with regard to 
democracy, at least not in the short term, but it had more effect on people who have been 
inspired”, the career diplomat concluded. He added that one positive effect of the 
chairmanship is that Kazakhstan has invited OSCE experts to monitor the 2012 legislative 
elections.
130
 
Stephen Blank, McArthur Professor of National Security at Strategic Studies Institute 
at US Army War College, said that the chairmanship and the summit was a “big thing” but 
“with no tangible outcomes”.131 The Astana summit was ”a big party for everybody, cynical, 
and brought no improvements”. According to Stephen Blank Kazakhstan wanted to show off 
that “it is a bridge between Eurasia and West”, although nobody, besides Russia, truly 
wanted Kazakhstan to chair the OSCE. “In Madrid Kazakhstan promised to deliver all kinds 
of reforms to improve democracy in the country, but in the end they have done nothing”, 
argues professor Blank. He believed that the OSCE is “a paralyzed organization” and 
therefore the chairmanship was just a” big party for everybody although they have not 
delivered on any issue”. “The chairmanship was successful in displaying that Kazakhstan is a 
strong and wealthy country. It was a PR success for Kazakhstan and Nazarbayev himself: 
they promised to do many things but at the end there was not much improvement on human 
rights”, Stephen Blank concluded. 
For Kathleen Kuehnast, Director of Gender and Peacebuilding Center of Innovation 
and expert in Central Asian affairs from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the 
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chairmanship and the summit “was a PR success”.132 During the ethnic conflict in 
Kyrgyzstan, which occurred during the chairmanship, Kazakhstan showed that “it can take 
the lead and solve the situation”. Kathleen Kuehnast argues that none of the Central Asian 
countries are rated highly on human rights, since their societies were based on the Soviet 
model. However, one notable aspect is that Kazakhstan has young and educated professionals 
who are a great asset for the country and can play an important role on the Kazakh foreign 
policy arena, Kathleen Kuehnast argued. 
J. Michael Lekson, Vice-President for International Development at the USIP, 
believes that although the chairmanship may have not brought many decisive changes 
towards the path to democracy, Kazakhstan has demonstrated that among the Central Asian 
countries was “the only international player that has the stature to play in the international 
arena”.133  Michael Lekson also argued that the country has well-trained diplomats, with 
significant international experience, and this could be another factor that may be taken into 
consideration when dealing with the region. He goes further and identifies a “niche” through 
which “Kazakhstan can provide support to the United States in connection to the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty. “ Kazakh diplomacy could play a significant role for the Non-
Proliferation Treaty by pursuing countries in the region, like India and Pakistan, to get it 
signed”, Michael Lekson explained. 
The USIP Vice-President‟s appreciations to the high quality of Kazakh diplomats are 
echoed by other Washington, D.C.- based experts on Central Asia. They highlighted that it 
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would be expected that the young generation of Kazakh diplomats help replacing old ideas 
with progressive ones and play an important role in balancing Russia, the US, and  European 
partners. From this perspective the OSCE chairmanship was a major diplomatic success for 
Kazakhstan, as well as a personal success for president Nazarbayev. On the other hand, 
experts argue that civil society„s opinion was not considered during chairmanship or the 
summit. They also admit that Nazarbayev was more concerned with promoting his 
international image rather than improving the country‟s reputation. Although the country 
failed to deliver on expectation, human rights situation in Kazakhstan did not get worse and 
the Central Asian nation seemed to be a little sensitive to international criticism and brought 
few changes in the domestic legislation. 
“Kazakhstan had the opportunity to do something, but it did not use this opportunity”, 
Sam Patten, Senior Project Manager Eurasia Program from Freedom House, argued.
134
 He 
also said that although the Astana summit‟s final declaration referred to the Helsinki Final 
Act principles which highlight the human rights dimension, no action plan has been 
mentioned in this regard. According to Sam Patten, the OSCE‟s Third Basket on human 
rights had no meaningful progress during Kazakh chairmanship. He believes that the 
chairmanship did not deliver any tangible products, did not strengthen the OSCE idea, nor 
did advance any specific mechanism for solving the frozen conflicts in the region. While 
Kazakhstan may have proved of being capable of organizing a summit of this importance, 
Sam Patten is questioning whether there was any meaning for this. “There is not very clear if 
there is any legacy and even Kazakhs have mixed feelings, some people feel proud while 
some feel that their taxes have been stolen”, concludes the human rights expert. 
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